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DO CASE OUTCOMES REALLY REVEAL
ANYTHING ABOUT THE LEGAL SYSTEM?
WIN RATES AND REMOVAL
JURISDICTION
Kevin M. Clermontt & Theodore Eisenbergtt

ABSTRACT

General Observations on InterpretingWin-Rate Data Properly. Many
empirical legal studies use data on plaintiffs' rate of success, because
of those data's ready availability and apparent import. Yet these
"win rates" are probably the slipperiest of all judicial data. Win rates
are inherently ambiguous because of the case-selection effect. The
litigants' selection of the cases brought produces a biased sample
from the mass of underlying disputes. The settlement process, usually conducted by rational and knowledgeable persons who take
into account and thereby neutralize the very factor that one would
like to study, produces a residue of litigated cases for which the win
rate might indicate nothing more than the percentage of successful
plaintiffs in this peculiar and nonrandom sample of cases.
Nevertheless, careful research and theorizing can sometimes
tease out an explanation of win-rate data by isolating case-selection
effects to reveal meaningful non-case-selection effects, such as the
effect of the forum chosen. This artful process of win-rate explanation involves controlling for and otherwise investigating multiple
variables to see which of the possible explanations conform to the
additional evidence, and then applying a plausibility screen to the
surviving explanations.
Specific Study of Removal Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' win rates in removed cases are very low, compared to cases brought originally in
federal court and to state cases. For example, our data reveal that
the win rate in original diversity cases is 71%, but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%. In a regression controlling for many case
variables, this "removal effect" remains sizable and significant. The
explanation for this phenomenon could be the ready one based on
the purpose of removal: by defeating the plaintiffs' forum advantage, defendants thereby shift the biases, inconveniences, court
quality, and procedural law in their own favor. Alternatively, the
t Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. We would like to thank Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
tt
Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell University.

582

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:581

explanation might lie not in forum impact, but instead in case selection: removed cases may simply be a set of weak cases involving (i)
out-of-state defendants who have satisfied or settled all but plaintiffs' weakest cases or (ii) plaintiffs' attorneys who have demonstrated their incompetence by already exposing their clients to
removal.
Our analysis indicates that both case selection and forum impact are at work. Thus, forum really does affect outcome, with the
removal process taking the defendant to a much more favorable
forum.
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DearAnn Landers: ....
In orderfor a father to get custody in this
country, the wife has to be physically abusive, a drug addict or a prostitute
who hasjust murdered the mayor of a major city....
-Dallas
DearDallas:.... Recent studies havefound thatfathers whofight for
custody win sole or at leastjoint custody in 70 percent of the cases.1
INTRODUCTrION
Here we go again: Ann uses win-rate data from case outcomes to
blow poor Dallas out of the water. Of course, she gives no details of
the win-rate studies, thus hiding their weaknesses, limitations, and
true meaning from view. 2 Nevertheless, it is obvious that she lumps
sole custody with joint custody, thereby mixing clear outcomes with
compromises and making any meaningful inference difficult. And
I Ann Landers, The Process Is Not Easy for a Single Fatheror Mother, ITHAcA J., Jan. 21,
1997, at 4C.
2 Not all custody statistics agree with Ann's. See, e.g., WALTER 0. WEMAUCH & SANFORD N. KArz, AMERicAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSmON 514 (1983) ("But the publicity con-

nected with isolated cases is not yet reflected in a change of statistics in custody awards,
which still favor mothers more than 90 percent of the time.").
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Ann seems to ignore the difference 3 between legal custody, which
merely governs the allocation of parental decisionmaking, and the
physical custody that concerned Dallas, an aggrieved father and attorney. But most importantly, Ann exhibits total unawareness of caseselection theory. 4 Most fathers might just surrender or settle, so that
those fathers who "fight for custody" may be those with cases nearly
strong enough to meet one of Dallas's criteria. 5 Thus, Ann's reliance
on data is more deceptive than descriptive. And although her unawareness of case-selection theory may not be surprising, her statistic
is improbable enough on its face as to suggest a case-selection explanation to almost anyone.
Ann Landers is not at fault alone. Legal commentators are discovering the rich store of empirical studies that legal scholars have
begun to create in good number. The commentators skim these for
their own empirical "observations," which readily permit unqualified
assertions that yield unbending conclusions. For example, not long
ago, we reported that medical-malpractice plaintiffs won 50% ofjudge
trials but only 29% ofjury trials, along with other like data. 6 We spent
fifty-four pages, however, explaining that judges were seeing a different stream of cases than juries were-a stream of cases that were easier for plaintiffs to win. Case selection, not real differences in judge
and jury behavior, drove the win-rate data to their suggestive but deceptive extreme. Nevertheless, newspapers reported along these lines:
3
See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMLy LAW IN A NUTSHELL 317 (3d ed. 1995); see also id. at
296-304 (noting differences in state laws under which custody disputes arise).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 21-30. Briefly, one would expect only close cases
to survive the settlement process and go to court, with decisions therein being evenly split.
Thus, a casebook's concluding note on the role of gender in custody cases is hardly surprising: "A study of all reported custody cases decided by state appellate courts in 1982 found
that fathers obtained custody in 51 percent of the cases; mothers in 49 percent." JUDITH
AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAmILY LAW 522 (3d ed. 1992) (citingJeff Atkinson, Criteia for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 tbl.B
(1984)).
5 A scientific study concluded that only 1.5% of custody cases go to judicial decision,
and that in settlements physical custody in the mother is almost eight times as frequent as
physical custody in the father. See ELEANOR E. MAccosY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING
THE CHILD: SocI&L AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137-38 & fig.7.2, 149-51 & tbl.7.6
(1992). As to the closer results in adjudicated cases, the authors observe:
Even if one assumes that on average mothers in fact have stronger custody
claims than fathers, it is certainly plausible to assume that fathers with relatively stronger claims to custody might well constitute a higher proportion
of those who continue to fight and reach the top of the conflict pyramid
[that is, adjudication]. If fathers without strong claims are more likely to
settle earlier in the process, then one would expect a higher proportion of
fathers at the top of the conflict pyramid to "win."
Id. at 153.
6 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJury orJudge: TranscendingEmpiricim, 77 COmLL L. REv. 1124, 1137 tbl.3 (1992) [hereinafter Clermont & EisenbergJury/
Judge].
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"A study published Thursday in the Cornell Law Review concludes
that juries are less likely than judges to side with plaintiffs in lawsuits
over car accidents, defective products and medical treatment. '7 This
view has entered the mainstream of legal writing. The massive and
excellent review of the jury system in a very recent issue of the Harvard
Law Review in part utilized our article thus:
However, reason exists to question the allegation that juries are responsible for high damages awards. A recent study of federal district court cases adjudicated during fiscal years 1979 through 1989
indicated that plaintiffs won more often before judges than before
juries in certain types of frequently litigated tort cases, including
product liability cases, medical malpractice cases, and motor vehicle
8
cases.
The ongoing renaissance of empirical studies is catalyzing an explosion of empirical misinformation about the implications of winrate data. This development is cause for concern. Because win-rate
studies form such a prominent part of the recent empirical literature,
the misinformation threatens legal reform. Part I of this Article explains the particular genesis of this misinterpretation of win rates. It
discusses the role of case selection in producing ambiguity in raw winrate data. Part II, with new data on removal jurisdiction, illustrates the
cure for the widespread misinterpretation of win-rate data. It presents
data showing that plaintiffs endure lower win rates in cases removed
to federal court than in cases originating in federal court. It then
discusses the plausible explanations, analyzes the interpretive pitfall
constructed by case selection, and concludes that the most plausible
explanation for much of the lowering of win rates in removed cases is
independent of case selection. The shift from a favorable forum, chosen by plaintiffs, to a less favorable forum, chosen by defendants,
drives down plaintiffs' win rates. Thus, notwithstanding the ubiquitous interpretive problem of case selection, carefully analyzed win-rate
data can convey useful information about the legal system.
I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON INTERPRETING WIN-RATE DATA
PROPERLY

The popular form of recent empirical studies involves examining
the parties' success in federal cases. The reasons for this focus are
that data on federal outcomes are readily available and that they appear to be full of meaning. But hidden dangers lurk in these slippery
data.
7

Reynolds Holding, JurorsAren't Pushoversfor Plaintiffs, Studies Say, S.F.

CHRON.,

July

25, 1992, at A6.
8

Developments in the Law-The CivilJury, 110 Hnv. L. REv. 1408, 1492 n.18 (1997).
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Nature of the Data

Data gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, assembled by the FederalJudicial Center, and disseminated by
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research enable study of the outcomes of all cases terminated in federal court.
When any civil case terminates in a federal district court, the court
clerk transmits to the Administrative Office a form containing information about the case. 9 The form includes data regarding the subject-matter category and the jurisdictional basis of the case; the case's
origin in the district as original, removed, or transferred; the amount
demanded; the dates of filing and termination in the district; the procedural stage of the case at termination; the procedural method of
disposition; and, if the court entered judgment, the identity of the
prevailing party and the relief granted. At present, the computerized
data set covers fiscal years 1970 through 1995. Thus, it contains all of
the millions of federal civil cases litigated over many years from the
entire country. In the aggregate, the data appear reliable. 10
Still, data of such vast coverage, gathered under sometimes confusing instructions, must contain minor gaps and misclassifications.
Many different people entered the data over an extended period of
time, although this dispersion at least would neutralize mistakes and
biases. Also, the standards for coding have evolved over time, which
necessitates careful attention. Only in fiscal 1979 did the Administrative Office start recording which party prevailed by judgment." In
fiscal 1986 it began to indicate meaningfully the citizenship of the two
9

See 11

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY

POuCIEs

AND PROCEDURES transmittal 64, at H--18 to -28 (Mar. 1, 1985). For a complete description
of Administrative Office data, see INTER-uNrvERsr CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-1987, ICPSR 8429 (2d ed.

Winter 1989 & Supps. 1990, 1992 & 1995) [hereinafter ICPSR]. For easy access to this
database, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. ClermontJudicialStatisticalInquir Form (last
modified Jan. 27, 1997) <http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.hun> [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Clermont, Web Site], which is discussed in Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M.
Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace,46J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996).

10 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 518-20 (1990) (discussing
strengths and shortcomings of the Administrative Office data, and concluding that the
data produce only minor' nonsystematic distortions); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart
Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation,72 CoRmNtr L. REv. 641, 677-81 (1987)
(comparing the impression conveyed by the Administrative Office data with that conveyed
by physical inspection of court records). For a description of possible sources of error in
the coding of awards by the Administrative Office, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation
Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A StatisticalPortrai 19 SEATn U. L. REV. 433, 439 &
n.13 (1996). Cf.Jennifer Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy ofBankruptcy Statistics, 101 CoM. L.J. 307 (1996) (discussing inaccuracies in special bankruptcy
data).
11 See ICPSR, supra note 9, at 15.
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principal parties in diversity cases, as well as their corporate or individ12
ual status.
Unfortunately, the Administrative Office data do not contain
other information one would like to know. They show no particularsof
each lawsuit. For example, although the Administrative Office form
distinguishes among many subject-matter categories, including
branches of tort such as medical-malpractice and motor-vehicle cases,
it does not distinguish among kinds of claims within the categories.
This failing is an important limitation, because outcomes depend
heavily on the type of case.' 3 One must always control for the case
14
category, but one would always like to control on a finer level.
When working with outcome data, one faces a difficulty in dealing only with formal wins. The Administrative Office data set records
only formal outcome, as in judgment for plaintiff or defendant. So a
formal loss, which may have been worthwhile for the plaintiff because
of its deterrent effect or other long-run benefit, counts as a loss. And
a formal win, which may have resulted in an unexpectedly small or
economically insufficient recovery, still counts as a win. Nevertheless,
formal outcomes, especially when averaged over all cases for many
years, can tell a researcher quite a bit.
Another difficulty lies in limiting the focus to technicaljudgments.
Many grievances are abandoned, claims satisfied, and disputes settled.
Most litigated cases settle or terminate short of judgment in some
manner that prevents ascertaining the winner. Nevertheless, judgments comprise much more than trial outcomes. For Administrative
Office purposes, judgments might be the result of adjudication, consent, or default, although they normally do not include voluntary dismissals or dismissals for lack of prosecution. Again, although the
researcher must keep the data's limitations in mind, the study ofjudgments can yield much information. 15
Usually, research focuses on outcomes in trialcourts. The Administrative Office termination data reflect all adjustments ofjury verdicts
by trial judges, but not changes on appeal. Appeal generally has a

See id. at 9.
See Marc Galanter, Case Congregationsand Their Careers, 24 L. & Soc', REV. 371
(1990); Neil Vidmar, MakingInferences AboutJury BehaviorfromJury Verdict Statistics: Cautions
About the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599, 605-08 (1994) (discussing the "apples
12
13

and oranges problem").
14

See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUB-

Lc PoLicY 38-39 (1985) (reporting that the type of injury in medical-malpractice cases
correlates to the plaintiffs chance of winning).
15 See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 744-48 (1992) (analyzing the completeness ofjudgment data).
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small effect on aggregate trial court outcomes?16 Yet if necessary, it is
possible, albeit unwieldy, to pin down that small effect by linking the
trial court data set to the comparable set of appellate court data the
Administrative Office gathers.
Furthermore, research in this area tends to consider only cases in
federal courts because of the richness and availability of this data set.
State data are much less accessible. This restriction could introduce a
troublesome bias to any study. However, some data from the National
Center for State Courts are now available on the Internet.' 7 Thus,
although the researcher must consider federal and state differences,
rough controls are becoming possible.
B.

Meaning of the Data

All these concerns aside, the most disturbing difficulty with federal outcome data is that they are inherently ambiguous. For example, win rates differ sharply from data on case duration. One uses
case-duration data directly and simply to study how long tried cases
last, so that the concern is truly limited to cases actually tried.1 8 But
one usually uses win-rate data to uncover some underlying factor affecting outcome more generally, such as a substantive or procedural
rule or some nonlegal factor favoring one side or the other in the set
of all disputes. The classic example is concluding, from differences in
win rates among cases tried before judges and juries, something about
their decisional behavior that might favor plaintiff or defendant.
Admittedly, win rates can teach some important lessons merely
on the descriptive level. For example, in an earlier article, we found
that foreign litigants win much more often in federal court than do
their domestic counterparts.' 9 That result is in itself surprisingly telling. It further permits this statement: "[T]he available data offer no
support for the belief that there exists xenophobic bias in American
16 See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the LitigationProcess, 1990 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 201, 224-27 (discussing the fact that "[o]nly a small fraction ofjury verdicts are
disturbed by appellate courts").
17 See Eisenberg & Clermont, Web Site; supra note 9. Those Web pages utilize a sampling that comprises thousands of state tort, contract, and real property cases terminated
during fiscal 1992 in the general jurisdiction court of 45 of the nation's most populous
counties. Also, these data are available on CD-ROM from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
18 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury orJudge: Which Is
Speedier, 79 JuDIcATuRE 176 (1996) (reporting that judge-tried cases last longer on the
docket than jury-tried cases). If one uses case-duration data not merely to describe tried
cases, but also to explore whetherjudges orjuries actually process cases more quickly, one
must worry about whether the effects are attributable to case selection. See id. at 179-80.
19 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts,109 HARv.
L. REv. 1120 (1996) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia].
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courts."20 Direct observations of this sort can dispel widespread mis-

impressions and more widely open the door to serious inquiry.
However, the observer usually wants to go farther, to understand
what is producing the observed win rates and reverberating throughout the universe of all disputes. It is this extra step in dealing with
win-rate data-the descent from the descriptive level to the inference
level-that leads the observer astray. And it is the case-selection effect-whereby the parties' selection of the cases to litigate produces a
biased sample from the mass of underlying disputes-that causes the
near-fatal ambiguity.
1. Inherent Ambiguity
An established body of literature describes what has come to be
called the case-selection effect.2 1 In general, this effect refers to the

proposition that the parties' selection of litigated or tried cases is not a
random sample of the mass of underlying disputes or cases, but instead is a biased sample. More specifically, theorists have tried to describe this biased sample, most often proceeding as follows. Disputes
and cases that clearly favor either the plaintiff or the defendant under
the law tend to settle readily, because both sides can save costs by settling in light of their knowledge of the applicable law and all other
aspects of the case. Difficult cases falling close to the applicable legal
criterion tend not to settle, because the parties are more likely to disagree substantially with respect to their predicted outcomes. These unsettled close cases fall more or less equally on either side of the legal
criterion, regardless of both the position of that criterion and the underlying distribution of disputes. Thus, even if the legal criterion
highly favors plaintiffs, as does strict liability, one should not observe a
plaintiff win rate well above 50%. Instead, case selection will leave for
adjudication a residue of unsettled cases exhibiting some nonextreme
equilibrium win rate.
According to this case-selection effect theory, any distinction between two streams of cases that the parties evaluate without systematic
inaccuracy should not lead to a difference in adjudicated win rates.
Indeed, under simplifying assumptions, and as a limiting implication,
22
the theory suggests a trial win rate of 50% for both streams.
Id. at 1132 (emphasis omitted).
See Daniel Kessler et al., ExplainingDeviationsfrom the Fifty-PercentRule: A Multimodal
Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235-36 (1996); George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation,13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
Compare Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185
(1985) (criticizing Priest and Klein's model) with George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection
Hypothesis: Learningfrom Wittman's Mistakes, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985) (defending the
Priest-Klein model).
22 See Priest & Klein, supra note 21, at 17-20.
20
21

1998]

WIN RATES AND REMOVAL JURSDICTION

Although refined theoretical work23 and comprehensive trial data2 4
do not support the 50% hypothesis, the underlying insight-that close
cases tend to dominate the limited universe of adjudicated cases-is
important in analyzing win rates.
In other words, the case-selection effect theory holds that win
rates reveal something about the set of adjudged cases, and not much
about the underlying mass of disputes and cases. But it does not predict any universal win rate, or that two streams' rates will be the same.
What factors might lead to win rates different from 50%? There are
three types of such factors.
First,different stakes to the parties is the most common explanation of win rates that depart from the idealized predictions of the caseselection effect theory.2 5 The doctor whose reputation might suffer
from an unfavorable judgment may have more to lose than the dollars
that one plaintiff seeks. The company defending a product-liability
action may have more at stake than the money sought from it in the
particular case. Such differential stakes may make defendants more
willing to settle the stronger cases, and so lead to plaintiffs' win rates
that are lower than either 50% or whatever other level one expects
absent the differential. Similarly, greater stakes to plaintiffs may raise
their win rates.
Many other factors are of this contextual type, in that they all
constitute real-world complications that alter the economic model's
26
simplified assumptions and consequently its purified predictions.
Therefore, for a stream of cases in which the main dispute concerns
damages, so that liability is a given, the formal win rate obviously
would increase. 27 Similarly, differences in the two parties' access to
23
See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victoy at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL
SruD. 493 (1996).
24
See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New TheoreticalFramework with
Empirical Tests, 19J. LEGAL STUr. 337 (1990).
25
See Theodore Eisenberg, LitigationModels and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567, 1579, 1581-82 (1989); Priest & Klein, supra note 21, at 24-29,
40; cf. Donald Wittnan, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining and the Selection of Casesfor Tiak A
Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 341-45 (1988)
(providing a more complete model). See generally Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuringthe Cost of CorporateLitigation:Five Case Studies, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1988)
(studying asymmetrical stakes more generally); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting
to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Tria 90 MICH. L. REV. 319
(1991) (broadening consideration to include parties' strategic behavior). The differential
stakes analysis also applies to litigants' different estimates of the size ofjudgment and different attitudes toward risk.
26 See Clermont & EisenbergJury/udge, supra note 6, at 1130-33; Theodore Eisenberg
& Henry S. Farber, The Litigious PlaintiffHypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RANDJ.
Eco. S92, S109-11 (1997) (special issue); Kessler et al., supra note 21, at 237-48.
27 See Priest, supranote 21, at 228-29; J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 284-85
(1989).
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information and competence in forecasting would also affect the win
rate. 28 Or, if the two streams of cases under study differ in costs of
29
litigating or size of potential award, win rates would not equalize.
Second, another type of powerful explanation of aberrant win
rates is the parties' mutual misperceptions about the prevailing standard of decision.3 0 If the parties perceive the adjudicator to be
favorable to the plaintiff, but the adjudicator turns out not to be, then
the apparently close cases would turn out to be losers and the win rate
would drop. Similarly, if the adjudicator appears to be neutral, but
turns out to be unfavorable to the plaintiff, then the win rate would
drop. Imagined or unperceived biases of the adjudicator therefore
affect win rate.
The direction of this effect on win rate is opposite to the misperception. An elevated win rate might not mean that plaintiffs have
an advantage, but merely that plaintiffs are not as disadvantaged as
the parties think. A change in win rate might therefore mean almost
the opposite of what it seems to mean. This complexity adds a cruel
twist to win-rate data's inherent ambiguity.
Third, strength of the case is a factor different in kind from both
the contextual factors and misperception. This factor draws on the
reassuring thought that a stream of stronger claims should have a
higher win rate than a stream of weaker claims. 31 The claims'
strength could lie in favorable facts, in an easy legal criterion, or in a
biased adjudicator. In other words, the case-selection effect is merely
a tendency to remove meaning from outcome data, but it may not do
so completely. Thus, for example, our earlier work found that transfer of venue out of a forum favorable to the plaintiff results in a low32
ered win rate.
The case-strength factor tends to diminish as the settlement process progresses, so that in trial data this factor has largely, but not
completely, disappeared. Thus, it is normally dangerous to work only
with trial data. At earlier termination stages, the case-strength factor
enjoys greater influence, allowing one to draw inferences with greater
confidence. 3 3 But generally, the case-strength factor is at work
throughout the litigation process. Thus, a strong positive correlation
See Kessler et al., supra note 21, at 242-43; Wittman, supra note 25, at 325-27.
See Kessler et al., supra note 21, at 246, 255; Wittman, supra note 25, at 335-37.
See Clermont & Eisenberg, Jury/Judge, supra note 6, at 1131-32, 1156-57, 1170-72
(discussing the role of attorneys' misperception of both jury performance and the "adjudicator's standard of decision").
31
See Kessler et al., supra note 21, at 244-45;Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and
the Relationship Between Trial and PlaintiffVictory, 103J. POL. ECON. 229, 232-35 (1995).
32
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil ofForum-Shopping 80
CORNELL L. R~v. 1507 (1995) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer].
33 See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., supra note 10, at 445-47 (reporting that the downward
time trend in product-liability win rates is observable in earlier stages but not at trial).
28
29
30
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exists between win rates on pretrial motion and at trial. 34 Also, it
seems that win rates for settlements correlate with those for judgments.3 5 In sum, one sees what may be called a "refraction effect" as
the win rate at earlier stages closes in on some nonextreme equilibrium trial win rate. Although the trial win rate may not convey much
meaning by itself, its meaning becomes clearer as one tracks back to
the mass of underlying cases and disputes.
2.

Residual Meaning

That last type of factor-case strength-is tantalizing, because it
hints that win-rate data can have straightforward implications. Win
rates may, after all, retain residual meaning, which case selection with
all its qualifications has not obliterated. The challenge is to tease out
the residual meaning in win-rate data by isolating the case-selection
effects from the case-strength factor, a challenge at which careful research and theorizing can often succeed.
The first step involves regression. Multivariate regression operates to segregate the independent effects of several variables, such as
time trend and case category, on win rates. 36 The dependent variable-what we are trying to explain-is whether the judgment is a win
or a loss for the plaintiff. The regression should use a broad set of
independent variables-factors that may affect the win rate-as controls. This technique helps to ensure that any comparison of win rates
rests on kinds of cases that are as similar as possible.
The second step involves formulating the possible explanations of
the observed phenomenon and then testing them by investigating additional variables. For example, if a possible explanation of a low success rate is inept counsel, one might compare win rates for corporate
and individual plaintiffs to see if the observed effect is more pronounced for individuals with their possibly less effective counsel. This
process can eliminate many possible explanations.
The third step involves the application of a plausibility screen to
the surviving explanations. Some will simply make more sense than
others, fitting better within the framework of accumulated experience
34 See Theodore Eisenberg, The RelationshipBetween PlaintiffSuccess Rates Before Trial
and at Trial 154J. RoYAL STAT. Soc'v ser. A, pt. 1, at 111 (1991).
35 See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 15, at 744-45, 756-58; Theodore Eisenberg,
Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers and Deals, 19 L. & Soc. INQUvRY
275, 292-93 & n.64 (1994) (review essay).
36 Multivariate regression is a statistical technique that quantifies the influence of

each of several factors (independent variables) on the phenomenon being studied (dependent variable). See generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELsTIN & BRUCE LEvIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERs 323-467 (1990) (applying regression analysis to various legal issues). Because the
dependent variable in this study is dichotomous (udgment for plaintiff or defendant), we

use logistic (rather than ordinary least squares) regression. See DAVID W. HOSMER, JR. &
STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION

1 (1989).
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and knowledge. For example, higher medical-malpractice win rates in
judge-tried cases than in jury-tried cases probably do not mean that
judges are more sympathetic to personal-injury plaintiffs than juries;
instead, case selection is the more plausible explanation.37 Reliance
on experience and knowledge may not sound too scientific. But in
fact, the prior two steps are less rigorous than they may appear
initially.
Our point is that this form of analysis is as much art as scienceand it is a difficult and subjective art. For example, one would surely
be disposed to accept the first plausible explanation, as one works
through the straightforward explanations of case strength and then
proceeds to wrestle with the more indirect case-selection contextual
explanations or to resort to convoluted explanations based on parties'
misperceptions. Caveat emptor accordingly applies to this form of art.
Therefore, the consumer of empirical research should verify that
the researchers had no axe to grind, that they truly immersed themselves in the data, and that they explained their investigatory and reasoning processes in detail.a8 All this requires time and effort from
both the user and the researchers. But art and science demand no
less.
II
SPECIFIC STUDY OF REMOVAL JURISDICTION

To illustrate the interpretive techniques discussed above, this Part
empirically analyzes an important source of federal cases-those arriving in federal court via removal jurisdiction. 39 Removal jurisdiction is
supposed to affect outcome. For example, in diversity cases, a plaintiff
suing in state court typically chooses that court to maximize its advantage. Removaljurisdiction allows the out-of-state defendant to remove
the case from the presumably more biased state forum chosen by the
plaintiff to a more neutral federal forum.40 It is hard to imagine that
the plaintiffs choice of forum has no effect, and it is equally unlikely
that allowing the removing defendant to undo the plaintifffs initially
unfettered choice of forum has no effect.41 Thus, this process should

affect outcome. But can we observe the intended removal effect by
observing win rates? And if win-rate differences emerge between re37

See Clermont & Eisenberg, Juy/Judge supra note 6, at 1174.

38

See CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRuTH: THE MANIPULATION OF FAGr IN AMERICA 237-

38 (1994); Vidmar, supra note 13, at 614-15.
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). See generally 14A CHARi.Es ALAN WRIGHr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3721-3740 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1997) (explaining law
of removal).
40
SeeJAcK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (2d ed. 1993).

41

See Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer, supra note 32, at 1514-25.
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moved cases and other cases, how should one interpret them, mindful
of the pitfall constructed by case selection?
This Part first presents empirical evidence of a "removal effect,"
and then works through several indirect explanations for the effect
based on case selection. It concludes that the soundest interpretation
of the removal effect is the straightforward one: a shift to an unfavorable forum depresses the plaintiffs' win rate, even after accounting for
case-selection forces.
A.

The Numbers

Removal of civil cases from state to federal court results in a precipitous drop in the plaintiffs' win rate. As we have previously reported, the overall win rate in federal civil cases is 57.97%, but in the
subset of those cases that have been removed the win rate is only
36.77%.42 Apparently, the defendants' ability to choose the forum
greatly augments their odds of success.
A new and closer comparison of federal-court win rates in original proceedings and in removed cases tells a similar, but more subtle,
story. Using the Administrative Office data for civil cases terminated
during fiscal years 1987 to 1994, Table 1 compiles cases terminated
only by judgment for plaintiff or for defendant, not by judgment for
both or for party unknown, and not by a nonjudgment such as a remand order. "Win rate," to be precise, is the fraction of plaintiff wins
among judgments for either plaintiff or defendant. The rows in Table
1 distinguish among the several bases for federaljurisdiction. The columns isolate the stage of procedural progress at the time of termination: "early' means judgment entered before filing of an answer or
before any court action; "trial" means judgment entered during or
after trial; and "middle" comprises terminations following court action after filing of the answer but before commencement of trial. The
pair of columns labeled "Total Win Rate" give the cumulative figures,
across all procedural stages, for each jurisdictional basis. For example, 73,131 diversity cases reaching definitive judgment originated in
the reporting federal court and 15,576 such diversity cases reached
that federal court by removal from state court.
The last pair of columns in Table 1 show that in diversity cases,
the win rate drops from 71% in original cases to 34% in removed
cases. This highly significant drop is of major importance, as removed
cases account for 17% of the diversity judgments in the data set. The
removal effect is notjust a diversity phenomenon, however. For example, federal question cases, excluding prisoner litigation, show an
42 RdLat 1512 & 1514 n.18 (reporting data from 1979-1991). The newer data in Table
1 indicate a 53% win rate in all original cases and a 33% win rate in all removed cases.
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analogous drop in win rate from 52% to 25%.4 Indeed, all the jurisdictional bases show the removal effect, once appropriate controls are
introduced. 4" Moreover, the removal effect appears at every stage of
procedural progress. 45 Nevertheless, with respect to what a comparison of original and removed win rates really means, a couple of obvious questions present themselves.
Why compare win rates in original and removed cases only in federal
court? We do so because the federal data are available. Nevertheless,
we recognize that, to some extent, the meaningfulness of the comparison depends on the assumption that the win rate in original federal
cases approximates the win rate in comparable state cases. Although
state data are less accessible, prior studies have indicated that federal
and state win rates are about the same. 46 Also, the state data from the
National Center for State Courts, now available on the Internet,4 7 permit the compilation of Table 2. It compares, across only those case
categories that are roughly comparable, federal and state win rates for
original cases terminated by adjudication in fiscal year 1992. The federal cases include judgments by pretrial motion or at trial from July 1,
1991, to September 30, 1992.48 The state cases include judgments by
summary judgment or at trial from July 1, 1991, to June 30, 1992.

43 The removal effect in the whole set of federal question cases almost fades from view
in Table 1 because of the heavy dose (45%) of cases brought by prisoners (case category
nos. 510-550). These prisoner cases are virtually all original proceedings in federal court
and are seldom successfil, thus seriously depressing the original win rate to 29%. Table 3,
which reports regressions that control for case category, accordingly reveals the true and
strong removal effect for all federal question cases.
44 Note, for example, the jurisdictional basis "U.S. as defendant." Although the raw
numbers in Table 1 suggest that removal increases the win rate from 19% to 33%, the
regression in Table 3 reveals the usual negative effect of removal on win rate, although it is
an insignificant one. The misleading increase seen in the raw numbers is another category
artifact, as most prominently shown by foreclosure cases: most federal foreclosure cases
against the United States have been removed, so that 18% of removed cases against the
United States are foreclosure cases (with an 80% win rate), while 0.5% of original cases
against the United States are foreclosure cases (with an 85% win rate).
45 See infra Table 4, Panel C.
46 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1122 n.10; Eisenberg et al.,
supra note 10, at 434-38 (reporting that win rates in jury trials in federal and state courts
are "strikingly similar").
47 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48 Beginning in fiscal 1992, the end of the federal fiscal year shifted from June 30 to
September 30. Therefore, the Administrative Office data for fiscal 1992 covers 15 months
rather than the normal 12 months.
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TABLE 2
PLAINTIFFS' WIN RATES IN ORIGINAL FEDERAL AND STATE

ADJUDICATED CIVIL CASES, FY 1992
DISTINGUISHED BY COMPARABLE CASE CATEGORY
(NUMBER OF CASES IN PARENTHESES)

Case Category [federal/state category codes]

Federal

State

Contract actions [110-190/21,22,24,29]

.6357
(4,291)
.5692
(130)
.9447

.7064*
(419)
.5714
(21)
.9350

(760)

(123)

.4528
(53)
.2105
(95)
.5027
(547)
.2276
(290)

.5926
(27)
.3182
(44)
.5425
(365)
.1630
(92)

.2326

.3095

(516)
.3552
(1,740)

(42)
.3624
(334)

.4415

.5476

Condemnation [210/31]
Foreclosure [220/23]
Other real property actions [290 (diversity) /39]
Intentional torts and defamation [320/6,9]
Motor vehicle [350/1]
Medical malpractice [362/7]
Product liability [195,245,315,345,355,365,385/3]

Other tort actions
[240,310,340,360,368,371,380/2,8,10,15,19]
Fraud [370/20]

(188)
(42)
* Significant at <0.05 by two-sided Fisher's exact test; ** Significant at <0.0005.

Table 2 shows that federal and state win rates track each other
fairly closely, despite the incompatibilities of data-gathering
techniques and the small sample sizes. Only the broad category of
contract actions-where, for instance, the subcategory of Miller Act
cases in federal court 49 might not match up so well with the state
subcategory of so-called seller suits-exhibits significantly different
win rates. One cannot reject the hypothesis that state win rates are at
least as high as win rates in original federal cases. We therefore can
defensibly use exclusively federal data to describe the removal effect
in terms of a comparison between original and removed cases.
But does the set of originalcases differfrom the set of removed cases? Yes,
of course. For example, Table 1 shows that, compared to original
cases, removed cases include few easy and early plaintiff wins.
Defendants who resist by removing cases are less likely than the mass
of nonremoving defendants to allow defeat at an initial procedural
stage. By itself, this difference creates a removal effect of depressed
49 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270f
construction contracts).

(1994)

(requirement of surety

bonds for public
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win rates. Also, the case-category mix differs between original and
removed dockets. Therefore, we need to employ a statistical
technique that controls for these differences between original and
removed cases.
Regression analysis allows us to isolate these differences while
controlling for several other known factors. 50 But a single regression
is inappropriate for our data. Table 1 suggests that the impact of
removal varies substantially according to the basis for federal
jurisdiction. For example, the drop in win rates is much larger in
diversity cases than in cases in which the United States is plaintiff. We
therefore conducted separate regressions for each jurisdictional basis.
In the interest of space, we report the full regression results for only
one jurisdictional basis-diversity. We then report only the size and
statistical significance of the removal effect for the other jurisdictional
bases.
Panel A of Table 3 thus reports the full regression results for
diversity cases. The dependent variable is judgment for plaintiff and
the independent variables include dummy variables for case category,
procedural progress, disposition method, and judicial circuit, as well
as continuous variables for termination year and amount demanded. 5 1
The independent variable of principal interest is the dummy variable
for removal. It equals one for cases that came to the reporting federal
court via removal and zero for cases originally filed in that federal
court. The coefficient for removal from this basic regression gives a
measure of the separate effect of removal on win rate, holding the
other variables constant. Panel A shows a sizably negative and
52
statistically significant coefficient (-0.711) for removal.

50 See supra note 36.
51 We included only cases from categories with five or more removed cases.
Controlling for amount demanded acts to hold the merits constant to the extent that
demand correlates with merit. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer, supra note 32, at 1518.
The amount demanded is missing from the Administrative Office data in many cases, so we
repeated the analysis by excluding the demand variable and including those cases with
missing demand amounts. The results do not differ substantially from those reported
here.
Later, we further control for the additional variables of the parties' corporate or
individual status and their citizenship. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
52 We explored regressions using many subsets of the explanatory variables reported
in Panel A of Table 3. In particular, we explored regression models omitting the
procedural-progress and disposition-method variables because of concerns about their
close correlation with case outcome. All of these regressions lead to a sizable, significant,
and negative removal coefficient. The removal effect is not an artifact of any particular
choice of independent variables.
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TABLE 3
REMOVAL EFFECT IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES,

Independent Variable

FY 1987-1994

A. Logistic Regression Results for Diversity Cases
Coefficient Robust Standard Error

Removal
Case category dummies
Procedural progress (early stage = reference)
Middle stage
Trial stage
Disposition method (default judgment = reference)
Co nsent judgment
Preetrial motion
Tri al method
Ot]her method
Judiciial circuit dummies
Term ination year
Amouunt demanded
Constrant

-.711
.032**
not separately reported
.158
-.199

.036**

.075*

-1.095
.104**
-4.195
.086**
-2.816
.110**
-3.029
.096**
not separately reported
-.038
.005**
-.023
.004**
79.175
10.374**

X2(46) = 10,299.35; prob. >X2 = 0.0000
log likelihood = -20,641.296; pseudo r-squared = 0.4050; number of cases = 55,875
* Significant at <0.05; ** Significant at <0.0005.

B. Regression Coefficients for Removal Variable by Jurisdictional Basis
Jurisdictional Basis
Coefficient
Significance
U.S. as plaintiff
U.S. as defendant
Federal question (prisoner & nonprisoner)
Federal question (nonprisoner only)
Diverse citizenship
Local question

-.207
-.128
-.844
-.832
-.711
NA

<.249
<.293
<.0005
<.0005
<.0005
NA

Panel B of Table 3 presents the coefficients for the removal
variable from a series of logistic regressions-one for each
jurisdictional basis-similar to that reported in Panel A. Panel B
shows that a consistent removal effect survives regression: a negative
coefficient signifies that removal lowers plaintiffs' win rate. That is,
while the raw numbers in Table 1 suggest the existence of a removal
effect, Table 3 tends to prove that the effect is not an illusion, because
the effect survives when the various case characteristics are held
constant. This removal effect is significant and sizable in the ordinary
cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship or a
nonprisoner federal question. In fact, the coefficients permit
estimation of the magnitude of the removal effect. 53 Compared to an

original diversity or nonprisoner federal question case with a 50%
chance of a plaintiff victory, an apparently identical but removed
53
For those two jurisdictional bases, the logistic regression coefficients translate into
odds multipliers of 0.491 and 0.435, respectively. For an explanation of converting logistic
regression coefficients into odds multipliers, and of the meaning of odds multipliers, see
Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1132 n.25.
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diversity case has only a 33% chance, while a removed nonprisoner
federal question case has a 30% chance.
B.

The Explanations
1. Forum Impact

The apparent explanation of the removal effect is that forum
matters. By removal, the defendant defeats the plaintiff's forum advantage, inducing such changes as dislodging the plaintiffs lawyer
from a familiar and favored forum, and more generally reversing the
various biases, costs and other kinds of inconveniences, disparities in
court quality, and differences in procedural law that led the plaintiff
to prefer state court.54 So, removed cases have lower win rates than
those in which the plaintiff chooses the forum, whether the plaintiff
elects state or federal court.
This impact of forum should not be a surprising one. After all,
55
removal jurisdiction is intended to favor the removing defendant.
"It is quite an anomalous jurisdiction, giving a defendant, sued in a
court of competent jurisdiction, the right to elect a forum of its own
choosing." 56 Indeed, removed cases comprise those cases in which forum matters most, or at least those in which the parties agree in thinking that forum matters most, because removed cases are those in
which both sides have tried to forum-shop.
The considerably increased advantages for the defendants should
show up in the data. Under federal law, certain pending state cases
are subject to immediate and unilateral removal by the defendants,
without any role for the settlement process during the removal process. After removal, however, the parties will settle or litigate subject
to the real or perceived differences of the federal forum. Because
those differences favor defendants, removal should lower the plaintiffs' -in rate. Therefore, because removal temporarily trumps the settlement process, the observed removal effect should be at least partly
54 These are the principal considerations that might affect the choice between a federal or a state forum, according to empirical studies of attorneys' preferences. See Kristin
Bumiller, Choice ofForum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implicationsfor Reform, 15
L. & Soc'Y REv. 749 (1981); Victor E. Flango, Litigant ChoiceBetween State and FederalCourts,
46 S.C. L. REv. 961 (1995); Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, DiversityJurisdictionand
Local Bias: A PreliminaryEmpiricalInquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1980); Thomas B. Marvell,
The Rationalesfor Federal QuestionJurisdiction:An EmpiricalExamination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1315; Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal
Cases UnderDiversity and FederalQuestionJurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REv. 369 (1992);Jolanta
Juszkiewicz Perlstein, Lauyers' Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction, 3 LAw & POL'Y Q. 321
(1981); Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases,47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962); Note, The Choice Between State and FederalCourtin Diversity
Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178 (1965).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
56 CRARLEs ALAN WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 223 (5th ed. 1994).
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the result of the change of forum, rather than merely an illusion explainable by case-selection effect theory.
What particular aspects of the forum actually cause the removal
effect? The leading candidates are real or perceived differences in
bias, inconvenience, court quality, and procedural law. With the data
available, it is not possible to pin down the precise causes, but we can
make a few observations.
On the one hand, some aspects of forum have less than the perhaps expected impact. For example, the significant change of law
upon removal 57 is the shift from state procedure to federal procedure,
but only in those states whose post-pleading process differs from the
model of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 58 To explore the role
of a shift in governing procedure, we ran separate regressions, each
similar to that described in Panel A of Table 3, for the Federal Rules
states and for the non-Federal Rules states. These regressions reveal
no great difference in the removal effect, as Panel A of Table 4 documents. Although the removal effect for nonprisoner federal-question
cases is somewhat bigger in non-Federal Rules states than in Federal
Rules states, the removal effect shows slightly the opposite trend for
diversity cases. This result suggests that forum-shopping for more
favorable law is not a major factor in producing the removal effect. 59

57 Cf Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer, supra note 32, at 1514 & n.17 (explaining the
change of law upon transfer).
58 We relied on John B. Oakley& Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1378-1424 (1986), to
select California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, NewYork, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin as the 18 non-Federal Rules states; incidentally, we similarly treated
the territorial courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands. This fairly small group ofjurisdictions is relatively populous, accounting for 62%
of the federal-question judgments and 64% of the diversity judgments in the data set.
59 Cf Miller, supranote 54, at 391-92 (stating that special federal procedures, such as
class-action certification or transfer of venue, are seldom used in removed cases). But cf id.
at 418-20 (reporting that the survey indicated that defense counsel prefer the federal summary judgment rule and practice).
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4

REMOVAL EFFEcr IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES,

FY 1987-1994

DISTINGUISHED BY STATE PROCEDURAL MODEL,
TRIAL MODE, AND PROCEDURAL PROGRESS

jurisdictional Basis
A. State Procedural Model
Federal question (nonprisoner)
Diverse citizenship
B. Mode of Trial

Logistic Regression Coefficient
FRCP
-.771**
-.699**
Judge

nonFRCP
-.841**
-.697**

Federal question (nonprisoner)

-.390*

-.087

Diverse citizenship

-.472**

C. Procedural Progress

Federal question (nonprisoner)
Diverse citizenship

Jury
-.161*

Early

Middle

Trial

-1.132**
-.859**

-.956**
-1.153**

-.233*
-.256**

* Significant at <0.05; ** Significant at <0.0005.

On the other hand, some preconceptions seem to hold up quite
well, at least at first glance. For example, many plaintiffs' lawyers fear
antipathy or other characteristics of federal judges. 60 Separate
regressions for judgments after judge trial and those after jury trial
reveal a much greater removal effect for judge-tried cases, as Panel B
of Table 4 shows. Removed plaintiffs fare relatively worse before
judges than before juries.
When we recall that Panel B of Table 4 includes only completed
trials, the results appear more startling. By the time of trial, one
would expect the settlement process to have largely neutralized the
impact of the trier. 61 Could it be that the lawyers are underestimating
the magnitude of federal judges' antipathy to plaintiffs, thus leaving a
fairly pronounced removal effect in judge-tried cases? The more
likely explanation is that the lawyers are overestimating the level of
antipathy of federal juries to plaintiffs, 6 2 thus relatively raising the
plaintiffs' win rate in removed jury-tried cases.
From this theorizing flows a renewed observation that the
removal effect exists at all stages of procedural progress. Panel C of
Table 4 reinforces this point. The ongoing settlement process might
reduce, but does not eliminate, the removal effect, even at trial.
60
See Flango, supra note 54, at 972-74. An anecdote of some celebrity appears in
JoNATHAN HARR, A Cvix. ACTION (Vintage Books 1996). That book recounts the
protracted Woburn toxic-tort litigation, in which the defendants dealt the plaintiffs their

critical setback by removing the case. A defendant's lawyer reasoned that the "federal
courts... had a generally higher caliber of judges whose tolerance for personal injury
cases of questionable merit was correspondingly lower." Id. at 99.
61 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Jury/Judge, supra note 6, at 1128-30.
62 See Miller, supranote 54, at 420-23 (explaining that attorney perception of state and
federal juries is a big factor in state and federal court preferences of plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers).
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Therefore, the advantages to the defendants of forum-shopping seem
to be real. Moreover, the parties' bargaining in the settlement process
might not fully take the defendants' advantages into account. Even in
tried cases, defendants fare better in removed cases than the parties
apparently expect. Although the parties clearly think that forum
matters, in fact, forum-with all its implications of bias and
inconvenience shifted in favor of defendants-may matter even more
than they believe.
Finally, it bears repeating that this study concerns only
judgments, and not the mass of settlements. Judgments include some
settlements in the form of consent and default judgments, but most
settlements do not produce a judgment. The actual or potential
improvement in defendants' position upon removal presumably
would also manifest itself in these nonjudgment settlements and other
dispute resolutions. 63 Thus, the removal effect seen in judgments has
a much broader importance with regard to the universe of all cases
and disputes.
2.

Case Selection

Before embracing the impact of forum as the explanation of the
removal effect, however, one must more seriously consider the possibility that the parties' selection of cases for removal yields a set of weak
cases compared to original federal proceedings, and thus a lower win
rate. That is, maybe the removal effect represents nothing more than
the impact of case selection.
The regressions served to avoid the most obvious case-selection
explanations, such as the fact that removed cases include fewer easy,
early plaintiff wins. But there may be further case-selection processes
that could explain away even the purified removal effect left after the
regressions. The possibility exists that removable cases have certain
characteristics that correlate with weak plaintiffs' cases, or it could be
that the defendants' selection of cases to remove among the set of
potentially removable cases signals weak plaintiffs. Systematically
thinking through the various factors that can cause two streams of

63
Cf. Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1139-40 (discussing the
influence of foreigner strength on nonjudgment resolutions). Some proof of this point
lies in the observation that, although removed cases constitute a substantial proportion of
judgments, they constitute an even higher percentage of the docket. Removed cases
account for 17% of the diversity judgments in the data set, see supra text accompanying
note 43, but they account for 25% of diversity cases if that data set is not limited to
judgments. Apparently, many removed cases produce settlements, probably often in the
removing defendants' favor.
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cases' win rates to depart from equality64 narrows the focus to differences in asymmetric aversion to litigation and quality of counsel.
First, and most plausibly, removable cases might involve defendants averse to litigation who therefore defend only their strongest
cases. Removed cases often involve out-of-state or foreign defendants,
especially in diversity cases. 65 The plaintiffs probably chose the initial
forum for geographic advantage. Because these defendants would be
averse to litigation away from home, they would satisfy or settle all but
their strongest cases. This tendency would elevate their success rate,
and hence lower the plaintiffs' win rate. 66 This could be a powerful
explanation of the removal effect.
We therefore must separate the impact of this locale aversion
from the forum impact in producing the removal effect. We can approach this task by looking at diversity cases exclusively, because the
diversity data after 1986 permit distinguishing the parties' citizenship,
as well as the parties' corporate or individual status. 67 We should first
64 See supra text accompanying notes 21-30. The other case-selection factors commonly involved, such as differences between streams of cases with respect to the parties'
relative stakes in the outcome or access to information, seem not to apply to the original
and removed streams of cases.
65 Specific to removal in diversity cases is the bar to removal by in-state defendants.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994). We therefore know that the set of removed diversity cases
involves out-of-state or foreign defendants.
66 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supranote 19, at 1133-35, 1142-43 (reporting
that foreign and out-of-state plaintiffs and defendants win more than their domestic
counterparts).
67 We can use a similar technique to fortify our earlier article's conclusion that a
change of forum caused the "transfer effect" of depressed win rates after transfer of venue.
Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer,supra note 32, at 1524-25. We had to qualify that conclusion in these terms:
[A] powerful case-selection explanation would be that transfer cases involve
defendants particularly averse to litigation in the plaintiffs' chosen forum,
and that aversion results in their defending only cases to which they have a
strong defense. We explore such a phenomenon with respect to foreigners
in Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1120 (1996). We believe, however, that aversion cannot
fully explain the transfer effect, which appears to be bigger than the foreigner effect despite the facts that domestic defendants would be less averse
than foreigners and would discount their aversion by the possibility of
transfer.
Id. at 1517 n.23.
In the current data set for diversity jurisdiction, there were also 1,550 transfer cases
with a win rate of 0.4535. A basic regression for original, removal, and transfer cases gives a
highly significant coefficient for transfer of -0.457, which stays big and highly significant at
-0.450 after controlling for the corporate status variables, and still stays big and highly
significant at -0.488 after additionally controlling for the citizenship variables. Therefore,
the impact of forum was indeed the principal cause of the transfer effect.
The odds multiplier for the transfer coefficient, as finally measured at -0.488, indicates that compared to a nontransferred original diversity case with a 50% chance of the
plaintiff's winning, an apparently identical but transferred diversity case has a 38% chance.
Cf. id. at 1524 n.39 (reporting that the transfer effect reduces the chance of winning to
40%, as measured by a similar regression for all jurisdictional bases).
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account for the parties' status, because corporate defendants heavily
populate removed cases 68 and because corporations tend to win in
litigation. 69 A regression similar to the basic one of Table 3, except
that it now controls for the parties' corporate status, produces for diversity jurisdiction a highly significant removal coefficient of -0.618.70
Then, a full regression that also controls for the parties' citizenship
lowers the highly significant removal coefficient somewhat, to
71
-0.462.
Thus, controlling for locale aversion drops this measure of the
removal effect only from -0.618 to -0.462. Even though one would
think that removal by out-of-state or foreign defendants would isolate
the most averse defendants and thus the weakest cases, controlling for
this aversion proves that removal still has a sharp effect on outcome.
Forum is a causative factor, probably the major cause. But admittedly,
locale aversion does contribute to the removal effect.
It appears, then, that both forum and aversion operate to cause
the removal effect. Indeed, aversion might explain the especial persistence of the removal effect in tried diversity cases, despite any theoretical expectation that by then the settlement process would have
largely obliterated the removal effect. The locale aversion in removed
diversity cases should show up even in tried cases-that is, a more
finely tuned case-selection theory would not predict original and removed win rates to equalize-because of differentially higher costs for
the out-of-state and foreign defendants and because of the parties'
72
misperception in exaggerating the advantages for in-state plaintiffs.
Second, and less plausibly, one might argue that the removed cases
are weaker because they involve plaintiffs' lawyers too unskilled to prevent removal and otherwise inferior to the aggressive and knowledgeable defendants' lawyers. But often, the plaintiff cannot prevent
removal. Statutes and doctrines, such as fraudulent joinder, often
prevent plaintiffs from freely manipulating jurisdiction.7 3 Moreover,
68
See Miller, supra note 54, at 391 (reporting that 62% of removing defendants in two
recent studies were corporations); infra Table 5.
69
In this new regression, the highly significant coefficient for corporate plaintiffs is
0.501 and for corporate defendants is -0.163, where the coefficients show a variable's effect
on plaintiffs' win rate and thus indicate that corporate litigants tend to win. See Clermont
& Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1131 tbl.2; Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 26, at
S109.
70
The odds multiplier here indicates that compared to an original diversity case with
a 50% chance of the plaintiff's winning, an apparently identical but removed diversity case
has a 35% chance.
71
The odds multiplier here indicates that compared to an original diversity case with
a 50% chance of the plaintiff's winning, an apparendy identical but removed diversity case
has a 39% chance.
See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1134, 1136.
72
73 See WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 185-89, 228-31, 233-40, 244-45 (discussing, inter alia,
the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the artful-pleading doctrine, joinder of separate and

1998]

WIN RATES AND REMOVAL JUPSDICTION

605

the removal effect hits corporate plaintiffs as hard as it hits individual
plaintiffs. Table 5 shows this fact by reporting the removal effect
among the regressed diversity cases for both corporate and individual
parties. 74 These data refute any simplistic explanation based on inept
plaintiffs' lawyers, as ineptitude would supposedly correlate with
noncorporate clients.75 Therefore, this alternative case-selection explanation, based on quality of counsel, seems implausible as an explanation of any major drop in win rate for removed cases.7 6
TABLE 5
PLAINTF 's' WIN RATES IN ORIGINAL AND REMOVED FEDERAL
D vPsrry CASES, FY 1987-1994

DISTINGUISHED BY PARTY PAIRNGS
(NUMBER OF CASES IN PARENTHESES)
Pairing

Original

Removed

Individual P v. individual D

.6538
(15,198)
.8721
(17,782)
.5452
(15,727)
.7897
(12,190)

.4278**
(2,223)
.6192**
(386)
.2897**
(8,777)
.3929**
(1,667)

Corporate P v. individual D
Individual P v. corporate D
Corporate P v. corporate D

* Significant at <0.05 by two-sided Fisher's exact test; ** Significant at <0.0005.

In any event, the pursuit by the plaintiffs' lawyers of a state-forum
advantage in the first place, despite possible removal, might suggest a
clever set of lawyers. Moreover, the risk of removal might lead the
plaintiffs' lawyers to discount their clients' chances, resulting in
independent claims or causes of action, and the minimum amount-in-controversy

requirement).
74 Separate full regressions for cases with individual plaintiffs and for cases with corporate plaintiffs indicate that the removal effect indeed is greater for corporate plaintiffi,
as the highly significant removal coefficient is -0.416 for the former set of cases and -0.703
for the latter. It is possible that this difference reflects greater forum-shopping by corporate plaintiffs in the state courts. Cf Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer, supranote 32, at 1516
(presenting similar data suggesting that transfer works to defeat forum-shopping by the
strong against the weak).
75
SeeJoHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAwYERs: THE SoCLALJ STuc
TURE OF THE BAR 127-30, 170-75 (rev. ed. 1994) (reporting that two separate hemispheres
of the legal profession serve corporate and individual clients); cf. Richard L. Abel, United
States: The Contradictionsof Professionalism, in 1 LAwYERS IN SocIrv 186, 232-34 (Richard L.
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (describing the stratification between "elite" and "ordi-

nary" lawyers).
76 Cf Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1133 (concluding that
wealthy foreign litigants' probable tendency to retain elite American law firms is implausible as the sole explanation for the observed "foreigner effect").
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bringing only strong cases, thus leading to a stronger set of removed
cases. In other words, arguments exist that the set of removed cases is,
in fact, not a weaker set of cases at all.
C.

The Implications

With the basic statistical manipulation behind us, removal
seemed to work a seriously negative effect on plaintiffs' win rate. At
that point, however, we ran into two very different explanations: forum impact and case selection. The forum-impact view holds the data
to be more or less straightforwardly meaningful, while the case-selection view implies that output data with uncontrolled input are too uncertain to support any meaningful conclusion. That is, do the data
mean something, in which event the drop in win rate rather obviously
suggests a loss of favorable forum? Or do these output data prove
nothing, because the input of original and removed cases could be
completely dissimilar? Because of this conflict, we needed to make an
artful but critical choice between the two kinds of explanation.
We had reached this crossroads before. On the one hand, we
studied the "foreigner effect," whereby foreign litigants win more
often than their domestic counterparts. We found implausible the
straightforward explanation that American courts favor foreign litigants, and so opted for the competing explanation that foreigners are
averse to litigating here and hence more selective in choosing strong
cases to pursue to judgment.7 7 On the other hand, we also studied
the "transfer effect," whereby the plaintiffs' win rate drops markedly
after transfer of venue from one federal district to another. Here, the
loss of a favorable forum, resulting in a strongly shifted balance of
inconveniences and a shift of local biases, seemed to be the sole
explanation, because we were able to discount case-selection
78
explanations.
In removal, we have found a phenomenon in the middle. The
especially large removal effect owes its existence to both forum impact
and case selection. Statistical analysis indicates a removal effect for
diversity cases in the neighborhood of a reduction from even (or
50%) odds for plaintiffs to about 35%.79 A further regression controlling for the case-selection theory of locale aversion, however, raises
plaintiffs' odds to 39%.80 The residual 11% reduction represents the

77
78

Id. at 1133-35.
Clermont & Eisenberg, Transfer, supra note 32, at 1514-25; see supranote 67.

79

See supra note 70.
See supra note 71.

80
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impact of forum, and it is roughly the same magnitude as that ob81
served after transfer of venue.
To summarize, direct explanations such as forum effect and indirect explanations of case selection both deserve consideration. Sometimes one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both-as in the case
of removal-work to produce the observed pattern in win rates.
CONCLUSION

The difficulties of interpreting win-rate data constitute a serious
impediment to describing, evaluating, and reforming the legal system.
The inherent ambiguity of win-rate data will often yield, however, to
sound analytic techniques. Here, a study of win-rate data on removal
jurisdiction leads to the conclusion that forum really does affect outcome, with removal taking the defendant to a forum much more
favorable in terms of biases and inconveniences.

81 See supra note 67. This comparison suggests a consistent "forum effect," whereby
the plaintiffs' loss of forum advantage by removal or transfer reduces their chance of winning by about one-fifth.
For transfer, we ultimately performed a cost-benefit analysis to conclude that "[g]ood
policy calls, at the least, for preserving the transfer mechanism." Clermont & Eisenberg,
Transfer,supranote 32, at 1530; cf. id. at 1524 n.36 (supporting removal of diversity cases).
Here we conclude only that removal affects outcome. We note, however, that Miller's survey research led him to consider expanding removal "to include cases involving federal
defenses or counterclaims." Miller, supra note 54, at 445. Certainly, if forum really does
affect outcome, formn-access provisions deserve the most careful study and thought as to
who gets access under what circumstances. The legal system must strive to equalize while it
optimizes access.

